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HIS Article focuses on the interpretations of, and changes relating
to, oil, gas and mineral law in Texas from October 1993 through
September 1994. The cases examined include decisions of courts
of the State of Texas and the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals.'
I.
A.

CONVEYANCING ISSUES
RESERVATION OF MINERALS

Harvey2

Dickens v.
involved the 1982 conveyance, from Rutten to Harvey, of 50 acres out of a 1162 acre tract, reserving "all mineral reservations, royalty reservations and/or mineral leases" in Rutten's chain of
title. The deed also stated: "No Minerals are transferred by this Deed."
Rutten had previously executed, in 1977, a coal and lignite lease on the
property and, sometime after 1982, had divided ownership of the minerals under the tract among Dickens and others (collectively, "Dickens").
In 1992, ten years after the conveyance to Harvey, Harvey sued Dickens, asking the lower court for a declaratory judgment that his 1982 deed
conveyed, as part of the surface estate, the coal and lignite. Dickens
counterclaimed for reformation of the deed, claiming that the failure of
*

B.A., J.D., University of Texas. Attorney-at-Law, Alexander & McEvily, Hous-

ton, Texas.

** B.A., University of Kentucky, J.D., University of Louisville. Attorney-at-Law, Alexander & McEvily, Houston, Texas.
1. This article is devoted exclusively to Texas law. Cases involving questions of oil,
gas and mineral law, decided by courts sitting in Texas but applying laws of other states, are
not included.
2. 868 S.W.2d 436 (Tex. App.-Waco 1994, no writ).
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the 1982 deed to expressly reflect a.reservation of the coal and lignite to
Rutten was the result of mutual mistake.
Both Harvey and Dickens moved for summary judgment. The lower
court granted summary judgment for Harvey, declaring that: the 1982
deed to Harvey did, as a matter of law, convey the coal and lignite as part
of the surface estate; the reservation clause did not reserve any right, title
or interest in the coal and lignite to Rutten; and Dickens was not entitled
to reformation of the deed. The lower court denied Dickens' motion for
summary judgment that, without regard to the ownership of the coal and
lignite, the 1982 deed reserved, as a matter of law, the royalty interest
under the 1977 coal and lignite lease.
Relying on Acker v. Guinn,3 the Waco Court of Appeals held that a
grant or reservation of minerals or mineral rights is not to be construed to
include a substance that must be removed by methods that will consume
or deplete the surface estate unless a contrary intention is affirmatively
and fairly expressed. 4 The court then discussed the amplification of that
rule in later decisions of the Texas Supreme Court. It cited Reed v. Wylie5
(Reed 1), for the rule that the use of the word "mineral" in an instrument
is not construed to include the near surface substances absent an expression of that intent; and Reed v. Wylie6 (Reed 11) for the rule that coal and
lignite deposits within 200 feet of the surface are "near surface" as a matter of law. 7 The court describes the two-pronged test of Reed II as follows: "[A] person claiming ownership of coal and lignite as part of the
surface estate must prove either (1) that the substances lie within 200 feet
of the surface or (2) that their mining may substantially impair or destroy
the surface." 8
The Waco court found that because the 1982 deed to Harvey stated no
express intention with respect to coal and lignite, it must apply the twopronged Reed 11 test. 9 Finding that neither prong of the test had been
satisfied by Harvey, and that material issues of fact existed with respect to
where the coal and lignite were located and the impact of mining on the
surface, the court reversed the summary judgment insofar as it found that
the coal and lignite had been conveyed to Harvey as a matter of law, and
remanded to the lower court for further proceedings10
The Waco court then addressed Dickens' counterclaim for reformation
of the deed to expressly reserve the coal and lignite from the conveyance
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.

464 S.W.2d 348 (Tex. 1971).
Dickens, 868 S.W.2d at 439.
554 S.W.2d 169, 170-71 (Tex. 1977).
597 S.W.2d 743 (Tex. 1980).
Dickens, 868 S.W.2d at 439.
Id (citing Reed II, 597 S.W.2d at 747-48).

9. Id
10. Id. at 439-40. The court also briefly addressed Harvey's argument that the 1972
contract for sale underlying the 1982 conveyance required Rutten, as a matter of law, to
convey the coal and lignite. It stated that although Rutten might be subject to a suit for
breach of contract or reformation, he was not constrained from conveying the property in a
manner contrary to a contract for sale. Id. at 439.
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to Harvey. Holding the claim to be time-barred, it affirmed the summary
judgment that Dickens take nothing. 1 The court cited Sullivan v. Barnett12 for the rule that a grantor is charged with knowledge of all defects
in a deed, and Latham v. Richey13 for the rule that absent evidence of an

exception to the former rule, the four-year statute of limitations for reformation of a deed begins to run on the date of the deed's execution. 14
While noting that mutual mistake is generally an exception to the rule of
immediate knowledge, 15 the court was persuaded by Harvey's summary
judgment evidence that Rutten knew of the mistake, if one existed, no
later than 1986.16 Consequently, the claim for reformation by Rutten's

successors, brought in 1992, had been time-barred since 1990.17
Finally, the Waco court reversed the lower court's denial of Dickens'
motion for summary judgment that, regardless of the ownership of the

lignite under Harvey's acreage, the 1982 deed reserved to Rutten, as a
matter of law, the royalties under the 1977 lignite lease.' 8 Distinguishing
the issue of whether the 1982 deed conveyed coal and lignite as minerals,
from the issue of whether the parties intended the terms "royalty reservations" or "mineral leases" to include the royalty under the 1977 lease, the

court held the rules of Reed II to be inapplicable.'

9

Applying general

20

rules for interpreting deeds, the Waco court found the use of the term
"royalty reservation" in the reservation clause to unambiguously reserve

to Rutten the royalty under the 1977 coal and lignite lease. 21
In French v. Chevron USA, Inc.,22 the court of appeals in El Paso was
asked to decide whether a deed conveyed a mineral interest with reservations, or conveyed a royalty interest. 23 Affirming the summary judgment
of the lower court, the appellate court held that the deed transferred a
mineral interest with reservations. 24

11. Id. at 440.
12. 471 S.W.2d 39, 45 (Tex. 1971).
13. 772 S.W.2d 249, 253 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1989, writ denied).
14. Dickens, 868 S.W.2d at 440.
15. Id. (citing Brown v. Harvard, 593 S.W.2d 939, 944 (Tex. 1980)).
16. Id. at 441.
17. Id. The court relied on the fact that Rutten had been sued twice in 1986, in separate lawsuits, on deeds and contracts virtually identical to the deed to Harvey and in which
the same or similar issues were raised. In one suit, Rutten had even counterclaimed for
reformation of the deed on the same legal basis pleaded by him in this action. Although
the two suits involved different parties and properties, the court found that Rutten had
knowledge of any mutual mistake, as a matter of law, no later than 1986. Id.
18. id.
19. Id. at 442.
20. Id (citing Martin v. Schneider, 622 S.W.2d 620, 621 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi
1981, writ ref'd n.r.e.)). The court cited Texas Co. v. Meador, 250 S.W. 148, 150 (Tex.
Comm'n App. 1923, judgm't adopted), as holding that "royalty" and "royalty reservations"
have well-defined meanings, and must be given those meanings, unless a contrary meaning
is indicated by the context. Id.
21. Id.
22. 871 S.W.2d 276 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1994, writ granted).
23. Id at 277.
24. Id. The lower court found the deed to be unambiguous and this rulingwas not
appealed.
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The deed at issue read, in part, as follows:
That I, GEORGE CALVERT.... do grant, bargain, sell, convey,
set over, assign and deliver unto CAPTON M. PAUL, an undivided
Fifty (50) Acre interest, being an undivided 1/656.17th interest in and
to all of the oil, gas and other minerals, in, under and that may be
produced from the following described lands, situated in Crane and
Ward Counties, State of Texas....
It is understood and agreed that this conveyance is a royalty interest
only, and that neither the Grantee, nor his heirs or assigns shall ever
have any interestin the delay or other rentals or any revenues or monies received or derived or to be received or derived from the leasing
of said lands present or future or any part thereof, or the renewal or
extension of any lease or leases now on said lands or any part
thereof. Neither the Granteeherein nor his heirs or assigns shall ever
have any control over the leasing of said lands or any part thereof or
the renewal or extending of any lease thereon or for the making of
any lease contract to develop or prospect the same for oil, gas or
25
other minerals, which is hereby specifically reserved in the Grantor.
The El Paso court first described the five essential attributes of a mineral estate in Texas: (1) the right to develop; (2) the right to lease; (3) the
right to receive bonus payments; (4) the right to receive delay rentals; and
(5) the right to receive royalty payments. 26 The court then cited Extraction Resources, Inc. v. Freeman27 for the rule that each attribute constitutes an independent property right, may be severed into a separate
interest, and may be separately conveyed or reserved by the owner,28 and
PrairieProducing Co. v. Schlachter,29 for the rule that when a mineral
owner conveys a mineral estate, all attributes are impliedly transferred
30
unless specifically reserved to the grantor.
In holding that the deed conveyed a mineral interest with reservations
rather than royalty, the appellate court relied upon Altman v. Blake3 1 for
the rule that a deed provision reserving certain rights did not change the
32
character of a conveyance from a mineral estate to a royalty interest.
According to the El Paso court, under Altman, the words "this conveyance is a royalty interest only" cannot serve to create a royalty interest
without an express reference to royalties for actual production of minerals, words which were missing in the deed at issue. 33 In addition, the
court cited a number of Texas cases decided prior to Altman for the rule
that a deed must refer to production in order to convey a royalty inter25. Id. (emphasis added).
26. Id. (citing Altman v. Blake, 712 S.W.2d 117, 118 (Tex. 1986), citing R. HEMMINGWAY, LAW OF OIL AND GAS, §§ 2.1-2.5 (1971)).
27. 555 S.W.2d 156, 158-59 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
28. French, 871 S.W.2d at 278.
29. 786 S.W.2d 409, 412 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1990, writ denied).
30. French, 871 S.W.2d at 278.
31. 712 S.W.2d 117 (Tex. 1986).
32. French, 871 S.W.2d at 278.
33. Id. at 278-79.
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est. 34 Finally, the court relied upon the fact that the deed expressly reserved leasing rights and delay rentals, noting that since royalty interests
do not carry these rights, there would have been no reason 35
to reserve
them had the conveyance of a royalty interest been intended.
Concord Oil Co. v. Pennzoil Exploration & Prod. Co.36 involved the

interpretation of a 1937 "two-grant deed" 37 which contained a granting
clause conveying a 1/96 mineral interest and a subject-to clause describing
a 1/12 royalty interest in existing leases. The deed did not contain a
clause dealing with future leases. The primary issue was whether the
deed conveyed a 1/96 mineral interest, which was less than what the grantor owned, or a 1/12 mineral interest, which was the full interest of the
grantor. The court held that the deed conveyed only part (1/96) of the
grantor's interest in the minerals, but all
(1/12) of the grantor's interest in
38
the royalty under then existing leases.
On August 5, 1937 A. B. Crosby executed a deed to Southland Lease &
Royalty Corporation which provided:
That I, A.B. Crosby... do Grant, Sell and Convey unto Southland
...

an undivided... (1/96) interest in and to all of the oil, gas and

other minerals ....
While the estate hereby conveyed does not depend upon the validity thereof, neither shall it be affected by the termination thereof,
this conveyance is made subject to the terms of any valid subsisting
oil, gas and/or mineral lease or mineral lease or leases on above described land or any part thereof, but covers and includes... (1/12) of
all rentals and royalty of every kind and character that may be payable by the terms of such lease or leases....
In 1961 Pennzoil Exploration and Production Company and others received from Crosby a conveyance of a 7/96 mineral
interest. Concord Oil
39
Company succeeded to the rights of Southland.
Concord argued that its predecessor in title, Southland, conveyed all of
Crosby's mineral interest as well as all of his royalty interest in existing
leases. Concord's argument was that under the "oil and gas notions that
prevailed during the 1920's and 1930's ....

."

the parties used the fraction

of 1/96 to describe what portion of the oil and gas then being produced
was received by Crosby, which was "1/12 of 1/8 provided under the ex34. Id. (citing Watkins v. Slaughter, 144 Tex. 179, 189 S.W.2d 699 (1945); Grissom v.
Guetersloh, 391 S.W.2d 167, 168 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1965, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Etter v.
Texaco, Inc., 371 S.W.2d 702, 706 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1963, writ ref'd n.r.e.)).
35. Id.
36. 878 S.W.2d 191 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1994, writ granted)
37. The court described a "three-grant deed" as one "with three blanks to be filled in:
one in the granting clause, one in the subject-to clause pertaining to existing leases, and
one in the future-lease clause." Id. at 193.
38. lit at 196. The court also held that the subject-to clause did not grant a full 1/12
interest in future leases, and that the deed was unambiguous which precluded extrinsic
evidence of intent. Id. at 197.
39. Id at 192.
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isting lease."'40 Although the court is not clear on the point, Concord's
argument apparently was that the uncertain state of mineral law during
that period, frequently chronicled by scholars and practitioners, together
with the circumstances of this transaction and the deed itself, demonambiguous as to what mineral interest was instrated that the deed was
41
conveyed.
be
to
tended
The court acknowledged the historical context in which the deed was
written and agreed that "most parties mean for... [a mineral] deed to
convey a single fractional interest in the minerals, the existing lease, and
future leases."' 42 The court also agreed that the multiple-grant deeds derived, not from a desire of the parties to convey different estates within
the same instrument, but from a misguided court decision, Carruthersv.
Leonard,4 3 which held that "a mineral deed did not convey an interest in
delay rentals (or presumably, the royalties) under an existing lease unless
there was express language of assignment.""4
The court held, however, that parties may convey different fractional
interests in one instrument,4 5 and that in this case, the deed did convey
different fractional interests in the minerals and royalty. The court's reasoning was that a "two-grant deed", which could be read within the "four
corners" 46 and which contained no future lease clause, traditionally had
been held to convey separate estates, and that "[t]he' 47 public interest in
certainty of land titles is overriding and paramount.
The court cited Garrett v. Dils Co. 48 and Pan American Petroleum
Corp. v. Texas Pac. Coal & Oil Co.4 9 in support of its conclusion that
40. Id. at 193.
41. Although the court states that it did not consider extrinsic evidence, it notes that
the conveyance to Crosby one day before, on August 4, 1937 conveyed 1/12 of the minerals
and 1/12 of the royalty. Id. at 196 n.7.
42. Id. at 194 (citing Ernest E. Smith, The "Subject To" Clause, 30 ROCKY MTN. MIN.
L. INST. § 15.02[1] (1985); Laura H. Burney, The Regrettable Rebirth of the Two-Grant
Doctrine in Texas Deed Construction, 34 S. TEX. L. REV. 73, 91 (1993); Terry I. Cross,
Conveyancing-From Repugnance to Harmony-The Demise of Alford v. Krum, in STATE
BAR OF TEXAS PROF. DEV. PROGRAM, ADVANCED OIL, GAS AND MINERAL LAW COURSE

F, F-1 (1992)).
43. 254 S.W. 779 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1923, judgm't adopted).
44. Concord Oil, 878 S.W.2d at 193. But it should be noted that in Carruthers, the
court held that delay rentals were not included in the conveyance of the minerals, but were
instead "paid for the privilege of drilling anywhere on the surface of the land .. and did
not arise from ... any of the minerals in which ... [the mineral purchaser J ... bought a
one-half interest, and is not, in any manner, connected with those minerals." Carruthers,
254 S.W. at 782-83. It is doubtful, therefore, whether the Carruthers court would have
recognized a transfer of delay rentals by anyone other than the surface owner. See also
Harris v. Currie, 142 Tex. 93, 176 S.W.2d 302, 306 (1943), in which the Texas Supreme
Court overruled Carruthers,stating that the proposition that delay rentals were owned by
the surface owner "was clearly erroneous, as ... [the mineral owner] had every right to the
surface of this land necessary to enforce and enjoy his mineral title that ... [the surface
owner] had for the same purpose." Id. at 306.
45. Concord Oil, 878 S.W.2d at 192.
46. Id. at 194.
47. Id. at 195.
48. 157 Tex. 92, 299 S.W.2d 904 (1957).
49. 340 S.W.2d 548 (Tex. Civ. App.-E! Paso 1960, writ ref'd n.r.e.)
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there has existed a "two-grant theory of interpreting deeds"5 0 which "has
been part of Texas law for at least half a century. '51 Based upon that
theory, the court concluded that "both fractions in this deed must be
given effect because there is no express future-lease clause to conflict
'52
with the granting clause."
The court acknowledged that its ruling may not have reflected "the
parties' subjective intent" 5 3 and that the "two-grant" doctrine may not
"comport with what the parties probably intended .... ,,54 But the court,
having held that the deed was unambiguous, refused to consider the parties' subjective intent, pointing out that Concord had not sought reformation and that the issue was "interpretation of the deed as written, not
reformation to reflect subjective intent.155
B.

ASSIGNMENTS OF MINERAL INTERESTS

In Robbins v. HNG Oil Co. 56 the Beaumont Court of Appeals affirmed
a summary judgment construing a December 14, 1911 deed to real property from Ephriam Garonzik to James Meaders.5 7 Abigail Meaders,
plaintiff and appellant, through her attorney-in-fact, Jewell Robbins,
claimed title, as an heir of James Meaders, to four tracts of land specifically described in the 1911 deed and to thirty-seven additional tracts of
land not specifically described in the deed. Claiming a one-eighths interest in the oil, gas and other minerals, she sought an accounting from defendant HNG Oil Company, and others,58 for unpaid royalties. Robbin's
claim to the additional tracts was based upon language in the 1911 deed
which stated that the property conveyed was all of the property that J. H.
McFaddin, R. D. McFaddin and A. J. McFaddin inherited through their
ancestor, William McFaddin. The thirty-seven additional tracts, although
not described in the deed, were alleged to have been part of the William
McFaddin estate and therefore conveyed by the deed.
The Beaumont court addressed four points of error raised by Robbins.
The first point of error alleged that the lower court erred in construing
the deed to convey only the four specifically described tracts of land,
rather than all tracts which were part of the William McFaddin estate.
Finding that Robbins had not raised the issue of ambiguity of the deed in
the lower court, the appellate court held that the meaning of the deed
50. Concord Oil, 878 S.W.2d at 195 (citing Woods v. Sims, 154 Tex. 59,273 S.W.2d 617
(1954); Richardson v. Hart, 143 Tex. 392, 185 S.W.2d 563 (1945)).

51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id at 194.
54. Id. at 195.
55. Id. at 194.

56. 878 S.W.2d 351 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1994, writ dism'd. w.o.j.).
57. Id at 353.
58. The other defendants were Elf Aquitiane, Inc., IMC Exploration Company, Pogo

Producing Company and Westland Oil Development Corporation.
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was a question of law for the court. 59 The court cited Lewis v. East Texas
Fin. Co.60 for the rule that it may not consider even the circumstances
surrounding the transaction when the instrument is unambiguous and
Reynolds v. McMan Oil & Gas Co.6 1for the rule that a party's intention,
however discovered, cannot contradict or destroy the legal effect of the
63
wording and language used.62 Relying on the case of Coffee v. Manly,
the court held that the specific descriptions of the four tracts in the 1911
deed controlled over the reference to the source of the interest in the four
tracts. 64 The court stated:
The [Coffee] court held that where a recitation was made to another
deed or another record for the purpose of showing from what source
the real property had been derived and as a help in tracing the title,
then such a reference or referral will not and could not operate to
description given in the deed which contained
enlarge the specific
65
the reference.
66
The first point of error was, therefore, overruled.
The court also rejected Robbin's second point of error, contending that
the appellees' summary judgment evidence was insufficient as a matter of
law to support the judgment granted in the lower court.67 The court described Robbin's argument under this point of error as follows:
As briefed by the appellant, this point of error two deals only with
the issue of which properties were conveyed. First the appellant concedes that the interpretation of real property descriptions is normally
a matter exclusively for the court; nevertheless, the appellant further
argues that when there is an uncertainty in the description that does
not appear on the face of the deed but had its origin in extraneous
fact or an ambiguity, then the identity of the land becomes 6a mixed
question of fact and law and must be determined by a jury. 8
In overruling this point of error, the Beaumont court concluded that the
four tracts were not described with uncertainty and that the 1911 deed

was not ambiguous. 69 In connection with her second point of error, Rob-

bins also apparently complained of: (1) the failure by defendants to submit summary judgment evidence of nonownership and nonproduction of
minerals on the thirty-seven tracts of land not actually the described in
1911 deed; and (2) the lack of such evidence by defendant Pogo Producing Company with respect to all tracts, including the four tracts specifically described by the deed. Given its prior ruling that the deed did not
59. Id. at 354 (citing Myers v. Gulf Coast Minerals Management Corp., 361 S.W.2d 193
(Tex. 1962)).
60. 136 Tex. 149, 146 S.W.2d 977 (1941).
61. 11 S.W.2d 778 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1928, holding approved).
62. Robbins, 878 S.W.2d at 354.
63. 166 S.W.2d 377 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1942, writ ref'd).
64. Robbins, 878 S.W.2d at 355.
65. Id. at 354-55.
66. Id. at 355.
67. Id. at 356.
68. Id. at 355.
69. Robbins, 878 S.W.2d at 355.
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convey any tracts other than the 'four specifically described tracts, the
court found it unnecessary to address the alleged lack of evidence in connection with thirty-seven of the tracts. 70 As to the lack of a nonownership and nonproduction affidavit by Pogo Producing Company in
connection with the four described tracts, the appellate court held that
Meaders had failed to prove her chain of title to three of the four described tracts of land. She failed to prove her claim of title because these
tracts had not been included in the inventory of William McFaddin's estate. 71 As to the remaining tract, the court held that an affidavit filed by
an owner of a title company, stating that he could not locate any instrument granting any interest in that tract to any defendant, and did not
know of any oil and gas production on the tract, was sufficient to uphold
72
the summary judgment in favor of Pogo Producing Company.
The court's conclusions that the 1911 deed conveyed only four tracts of
land, that Robbins established a proper chain of title only to one of those
four tracts, and that there was no evidence of either production of minerals or of ownership of the remaining tract by any defendant, in fact disposed of all of the issues in the case. The El Paso court, however,
engaged in a lengthy discussion of the doctrines of collateral estoppel, res
judicata and stare decisis.
Robbins was also the plaintiff in two federal court cases decided by the
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, styled Robbins v. Amoco Prod. Co.73 and
Clark v. Amoco Prod. Co. 7 4 The Beaumont Court of Appeals thus
stated: "We determine that the doctrine of collateral estoppel properly
applies and is a correct basis for one of the separate, independent
grounds for the granting of the motion for summary judgment. ' 75 The
court rejected Robbin's argument that a lack of mutuality of parties
should have defeated defendants' motion for summary judgment on the
ground of collateral estoppel. 76 In this regard, the court relied upon Eagle PropertiesLtd. v. Scharbauer,77 for the rule that the doctrine of collateral estoppel applies where the party against whom it is asserted was a
party, or in privity with a party, in prior litigation. 78 Noting that Robbins
was a party in both prior federal cases, 79 both in her individual capacity
and on behalf of 200 heirs of James Meaders, the court stated: "In this
State [sic] litigation [Robbins] is suing as the attorney-in-fact for Abigail,
as the heir of James Meaders. Therefore, we conclude that Abigail is in
70. Id. at 356.
71. Id. at 362.
72. Id. at 356-57, 363.
73. 952 F.2d 901 (5th Cir. 1992).
74. 908 F.2d 29 (5th Cir. 1990).
75. Robbins, 878 S.W.2d at 357.
76. Id.
77. 807 S.W.2d 714 (Tex. 1990).
78. Robbins, 878 S.W.2d at 357. The court also cited Myrick v. Moody Nat'l Bank, 590
S.W.2d 766, 769 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1979, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Hardy v.
Fleming, 553 S.W.2d 790, 793 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Tarter v.
Metropolitan Sav. & Loan Ass'n.
79. Id. at 357-58.
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privity with the two hitndred heirs of the same James Meaders inasmuch
as she claims directly under James Meaders. . . ."80 Although the holding
is probably correct, the court cited no authority for the rule that privity
necessarily exists between all heirs of a common ancestor.
In addition, the court seemingly added a new factor to be considered in
determining whether a claim is barred by collateral estoppel, i.e., "an
identity of lawyers at crucial times."'' l The court stated:
It is significant and important that in the Federal [sic] court suit that
Robbins as plaintiff both in the trial court and as appellant in the
appeal was represented by the legal professional who has represented Robbins in the case at bar at the time the summary judgment
for the defendants was granted. 82
The court concluded that the federal and state cases involved identical
issues of law, and that those issues were actually litigated in federal court
83
and were essential to the judgment.

Finally, the court also upheld the lower court's summary judgment in
favor of defendants under the doctrine of stare decisis,8 and what the
court referred to as "the [d]octrine of [i]ssue [p]reclusion a/k/a
[p]reclusion by [j]udgment.
II.

85

OIL, GAS AND MINERAL LEASES
A.

LEASE COVENANTS

Rogers v. Ricane Enterprises86 was a trespass to try title case filed by
the plaintiffs under a partial assignment of an oil and gas lease to recover
possession of a working interest in a 329.3 acre tract. In general, the issues were presented as attacks on plaintiff's proof of superior title out of
a common source. The supreme court, in a divided opinion, 87 reversed
the trial court and the court of appeals and held that plaintiffs had proved
their title.
In 1937 an oil and gas lease from Dean to Wiggins covered 793 acres
(base lease), and provided for a primary term of ten years and "as long
80. Id. at 358.
81. Id.
82. Id
83. Id.
84. Id. at 361 (citing Case-Pomeroy Oil Corp. v. Pure Oil Company, 279 S.W.2d 886
(Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1955, writ ref'd)).
85. Id (citing Van Dyke v. Boswell, O'Toole, Davis & Pickering, 697 S.W.2d 381 (Tex.
1985); and RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 27 (1980)). The court was presumably referring to the doctrine of res judicata. The court stated: "We hold in this case that it
is correct to give effect to the holdings, judgments, and opinions of the Fifth Circuit Court
[sic]." Robbins, 878 S.W.2d at 362.
86. 884 S.W.2d 763 (Tex. 1994). This is the fourth appellate opinion written in this
dispute. See 772 S.W.2d 76 (Tex. 1989), 775 S.W.2d 391 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1989, writ
granted), and 852 S.W.2d 751 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1993, writ granted) for the previous
opinions. See also James V. Hammett, Jr. and Deborah E. Taylor, Oil, Gas and Mineral
Law, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 47 SMU L. REv. 1439, 1453 (1994).
87. Id. at 770. Inexplicably, the majority and dissent broke out into the all-too-familiar
teams common to personal injury actions.
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thereafter as oil and gas ...is produced ....
,,88 The lease provided that
after expiration of the primary term, and upon cessation of production,
the lessee would have sixty days within which to commence operations.
The lease was assignable in whole or in part and provided that if the
leased premises" 'shall hereafter be owned in the severalty or in separate
tracts, the premises, nevertheless shall be developed . . . as one

lease ....

'

"89

Production was promptly obtained on the lease and continued through
all times material to the case, thereby keeping the base lease alive. On
June 1, 1949, Superior Oil Company (Superior), which had acquired the
base lease by assignment, assigned a leasehold interest in 329.3 acres out
of the 7893 acres upon which there was no production to Western and
others. The assignment required Western to drill a well within thirty
days, failing which the assignment would "cease and terminate and...
revert to and revest in Superior... -90 Western also agreed to assume all
"express and implied base lease obligations. . ." and recognized that
"there now are a number of ...offset wells which Western shall protect
against by the drilling of properly located wells on the... land." 9 1
The assignment also provided:
5.
In the event that the production of oil, gas ... is developed ... and
Western desires to abandon or cease operating the same, Western
shall notify Superior ...and Superior may, at its election, require
Western to transfer and assign to Superior... all of Western's right
...to said lease....
6.
Upon termination of the rights of Western hereunder and/or with
respect to the ... lease ... or otherwise, Western shall deliver to
Superior upon demand, a good and sufficient quit-claim deed and
release. Any delay.., of Western to deliver any such quit-claim and
release shall in no way prevent such rights from terminating, and reverting to and revesting in Superior as herein expressly provided and
contemplated .92
Western promptly drilled a producing well. During the life of the well,
in August 1960, E. P. Campbell, the president and a stockholder of Western, in his individualcapacity only, sold, assigned, and transferred to Da93
kota Company, Inc. (Dakota)
all of the right title and interest ...as conveyed to [him] by Assignments of record [including conveyance of] all of [his] right, title and
interest ...in [the base lease] ... insofar as said lease covers the ...
329.3 acres ...subject to the exceptions, reservations and provisions
88. Id at 764.
89. Id.

90. Rogers v. Ricane, 772 S.W.2d 76, 78 (Tex. 1989).
91. Id at 78.
92. Rogers, 884 S.W.2d at 765-66.
93. Id. at 765, 769. Campbell was also an officer and director of Dakota. See Rogers,
852 S.W.2d at 755.
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stated, but all without warranty of any kind, either expressed or

implied. 94
Though the assignment refers to previous conveyances to Campbell,
neither the instruments nor evidence sufficient as a substitute were introduced. Through a series of conveyances thereafter, Ricane Enterprises,
et al. succeeded to the rights of Dakota and in October 1979, drilled a
successful well.
The early well, which had been drilled on the 329.3 acres, ceased production in July 1961, and no drilling activity or production had occurred
after that date until the Ricane well in 1979. Campbell died in 1961 and
in 1965 Western's charter was forfeited by the State of Texas for nonpayment of franchise taxes. A former Western director and shareholder
testified that he wound up Western's affairs and that it was insolvent, but
he did not testify as to the title to the working interest.
The plaintiffs, who were stockholders and other successors to the assets
of Western, filed suit in 1984 against Ricane in trespass to try title for
possession of the 329.3 acres. Following the successful appeal by the
plaintiffs of a summary judgment for defendants, the case was tried to a
jury which answered eighteen different issues. Among them were findings that Western had "abandoned or ceased operating" the premises and
that Western had "abandoned the purposes" of the assignment. 95 The
trial court entered a take-nothing judgment against the plaintiffs and the
had terminated in
court of appeals affirmed on the ground that the lease 96
light of the jury's finding of abandonment of purpose.
Ricane first attacked the plaintiff's title by arguing that the assignment
terminated by its own terms under its paragraphs 5 and 7, because of
Western's failure to transfer the premises back to Superior.97 The court,

however, held that paragraph 7 was "triggered [only] upon failure of
some other provision leading to termination of Western's rights...." and
that the only condition which could lead to automatic termination of the
assignment was a failure to drill the initial well within 30 days. 98
Ricane also argued that under the doctrine of Texas Co. v. Davis,99 the
assignment had automatically terminated, either because of abandonment or because the purpose of the assignment had ceased with cessation
of production. The court reaffirmed the Davis doctrine, but distinguished
it because "the assignment in this case does not, by its express terms,
specify a purpose for the assignment and does not contain any language
94. Id. at 769.
95. Rogers, 852 S.W.2d at 759.
96. Rogers, 884 S.W.2d at 765.

97. Id. at 766. Apparently, Superior sent two letters to Western in 1966 demanding a
reassignment because of the cessation of production. Superior, however, did not sue to
enforce its rights and was never made a party to this litigation. Id.at 770.
98. Id. at 766.
99. 113 Tex. 321, 254 S.W. 304 (1923). The court also cites W.T. Waggoner Estate v.
Sigler Oil Co., 118 Tex. 509, 19 S.W.2d 27, 29 (1929) in which the court distinguished the
theories of abandonment of title, which Texas does not recognize, and the cessation of use
of an oil and gas lease doctrine established by Davis. Rogers, 884 S.W.2d at 767.
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limiting the duration of the assignment to 'as long, as' oil and gas is pro-

duced."'1

Finding that Davis did not control, the Court held that the

finding of abandonment of purpose was immaterial.

The court further found that provisions for termination in the base
lease did not control the rights of Rogers and Ricane and that the assignment, which did not clearly and unequivocally create a conditional estate,
did not contain an implied determinable fee. 01 The court also noted that
even if a drilling purpose were implied, the appropriate remedy wotild be

an action for breach of that implied covenant, and not automatic
termination. 0 2
Ricane also argued that Rogers had failed to prove a superior title as
required in a trespass to try title case.' 0 3 Ricane's first point was that

Rogers had failed to prove a regular chain of conveyances into plaintiffs,
because in some way (and the court is not clear on this), Western's title

disappeared in the wake of its insolvency and the forfeiture of its charter.' 4 The court held, however, that upon forfeiture of the charter, the
shareholders of the company became trustees of its property for the benefit of its creditors' 0 5 and that no showing of a transfer of title out of the
10 6
shareholders had been made.

Ricane's second point was that Rogers had failed to prove a superior
title, because Ricane's assignment from Western, coming earlier in time,

was superior. The court, however, held that the assignment from Campbell to Dakota was nothing more than a quitclaim, conveying title only if
Campbell held title, and that Ricane had failed to prove that Campbell,
individually, held any title to the 329.3 acres. 10 7
Ricane also argued a "reverse alter ego doctrine" theory, to the effect

that in executing the assignment to Dakota, Campbell was de facto the
company, Western. The court refused the argument and held that
100. Rogers, 884 S.W.2d at 767.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. While the parties agreed that the method of proving title in this case would be by
superior title from a common source, the court noted that other available methods of proving title in a trespass case were by proving a regular chain of conveyances from the sovereign, proving title by limitations, or by proving prior possession, not abandoned. There
was no need for Rogers to prove common source due to Ricane's agreement that both
parties derived whatever title they held from Western, the common source. Id. at 768.
104. Id. at 769.
105. Id. at 768.
106. Id. at 769. If unpaid creditors of Western still exist, it would seem that the now
successful stockholders of the defunct company would remain trustees of its assets, subject
to applicable limitations statutes, if any.
107. Id at 765. The court notes that if Campbell's assignment had contained a warranty, his heirs, who were also plaintiffs in the Rogers group, might have been estopped to
assert trespass to try title. Id. at 769 n.5 (citing Clark v. Gauntt, 138 Tex. 558, 161 S.W.2d
270, 271-72 (1942)). Other than its possible effect on Campbell's heirs, it is difficult to see
how a warranty could have affected the result in this case. Once the issue of termination
was decided, Ricane could argue no more than that Western breached its covenants in the
Superior assignment, a position which only Superior could assert in the absence of other
pleading such as third party beneficiary entitlement. See San Antonio Loan & Trust Co. v.
Rabb, 155 S.W.2d 981 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1941, writ ref'd. w.o.m.)
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"[b]ecause Campbell executed the instrument in personal capacity, and
the instrument itself does not reflect that Campbell purports to act on
behalf of Western, the reverse alter ego theory does not apply." 10 8 The
court further held that there was no evidence that Western ratified Campbell's assignment.10 9
Finally, Ricane argued that division orders issued by Superior recognized its title, thereby in some way creating title in Ricane. The court
held, however, that "[w]hile a division order can create a contractual relationship, it does not transfer title" and that "division orders do not replace or invalidate the original assignment."' 1 0
Rogers had also sued for conversion of its runs for the period of time
since the Ricane well was drilled in 1979. The court of appeals had not
considered those points, so the supreme court remanded the case to the
appeals court.
The dissent argued that the Davis case should control the result. Taking issue with the majority's position that in order for Davis to control,
there must have been an express statement of purpose in the Superior
assignment, the dissent argued that the absence of express language of
purpose did not mean that the contract had no purpose."1 Further arguing that the purpose was for exploration, development and production of
oil and gas, the dissent concluded that "a complete failure to pursue that
purpose-'not a partial use, nor a negligent use, nor an imperfect use, but
cessation of use'1 2 is an abandonment of the purpose, which terminates
3
the estate.""1
J.M.Huber Corp. v. Santa Fe Energy Resources, Inc." 4 involved the
construction of four oil and gas leases between J.M. Huber or Mobil Producing Texas and New Mexico, Inc., as lessees, and Santa Fe Energy Resources, Inc., as lessor. The clauses at issue concerned the payment of
taxes and came in two forms. The earlier lease forms read:
It is expressly agreed that during the life of this lease Lessee shall
pay all taxes of every kind lawfully levied or assessed upon or against
all or any part of the minerals in or under said land and/or the production thereof, including gross production and severance taxes and
transportation taxes, and all increases in taxes on the land resulting
from the prospecting
for and discovery and/or production of miner15
als therefrom.
The more recent lease forms read:
108.
109.
110.
111.

Id. at 769.
Id.
Id. at 770.
Id.

112. Id. at 770-71 (citing Waggoner Estate, 19 S.W.2d at 29).
113. Id. But see the majority's argument, citing Waggoner Estate, 19 S.W.2d at 32, that
courts should not find that a lease has been forfeited or terminated upon breach of an
implied obligation. Id at 767.
114. 871 S.W.2d 842 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1994, writ denied).
115. Id. at 843, n.1.
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During the life of this lease, Lessee shall pay all taxes of every kind
lawfully levied or assessed upon or against all or any part of the oil
and gas in or under said Leased Premises and/or the production
thereof, including gross production, severance and transportation
taxes, and all increases in taxes on the Leased Premises resulting
from the prospecting for, discovery or production of oil and gas
116
therefrom.
The disputed tax was the Crude Oil Windfall Profit Tax Act of 1980.117
The lessees had withheld from royalty payments to Santa Fe the amount
of the windfall profit tax due and had remitted the tax to the United
States government. Santa Fe maintained that the leases shifted the burden of paying the windfall profit tax to the lessees and filed its action for
a declaratory judgment that payment of all windfall profit taxes were,
under the express lease provisions, the burden of the lessees. The lessees
contended that the lease provisions did not apply to the windfall profit
tax and that the suit was expressly barred by federal law and by explicit
lease provisions. The trial court granted a summary judgment in favor of
Santa Fe, and the lessees appealed.
The appellate court first discussed Santa Fe Energy Co. v. Baxter," 8
which it cited for the rules that the determination of the character of the
windfall profit tax was a matter of state law, and that the tax was similar
to an excise or severance tax which may be shifted to an oil and gas lessee
under an appropriate tax shifting provision in a lease. 1 9 The court was
unpersuaded by the lessees' argument that Baxter was wrongly decided
and should be overruled on the basis that the court is "bound by the
decisions of lower federal courts regarding construction of this federal
20
taxing act.'
Relying upon Carlisle v. Philip Morris, Inc.,121 Barstow v. State,122 and
Penrod Drilling Corp. v. Williams, 23 the appellate court held that only
the opinions of the United States Supreme Court are controlling in a
state court on federal matters; the opinions of lower federal courts are
persuasive, but not binding. 124 The court expressly rejected the argument
that Holmes v. Olson125 requires Texas courts to follow federal court decisions, stating:
In construing its own opinion in Olson and the supreme court's per
curiam opinion refusing application for writ of error, the Austin
court of appeals noted that they did not intend to hold that state
116. Id. at 843.

117. 26 U.S.C. § 4986(a) (repealed 1988).
118. 783 S.W.2d 643 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1989, writ denied).
119. J.M. Huber Corp., 871 S.W.2d at 845-46.

120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.

1& at 846.
805 S.W.2d 498, 505 (Tex. App.-Austin 1991, writ denied).
742 S.W.2d 495, 501 n.2 (Tex.App.-Austin 1987, writ denied).
865 S.W.2d 294 (Tex. 1993).
J.M. Huber Corp., 871 S.W.2d at 846.
587 S.W.2d 678 (Tex. 1979).
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courts are bound by lower federal court opinions, but that such decisions are entitled to due weight and consideration. 126
The Fourteenth Court of Appeals then refused to hold that two decisions of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals required the overruling of its

decision in Baxter.127 It was not persuaded by Tenneco West, Inc. v. Marathon Oil Co. 128 even though the Ninth Circuit, interpreting a similar tax

shifting provision, held that the burden of payment of the windfall profit
tax was not shifted to the lessee. 129 Finding that the Ninth Circuit decided the case on the basis of California rather than federal law, the Fourteenth Court of Appeals stated: "The [Ninth Circuit] relied on a
[California] state law case 130 containing an almost identical clause which
held that such a clause did not encompass the windfall profits tax.' 31
Consequently, it found that the Ninth Circuit's later characterization of
the tax as an incremental value tax rather than an excise tax was purely
dictum. The court dismissed the other Ninth Circuit case, Exxon Corp. v.
City of Long Beach,132 as relying entirely on Tenneco West. 133 Finally, the

appellate court also held that the decisions of Texas courts in Stanolind

Oil & Gas Co. v. Terrell,134 Cities Service Oil Co. v. McCrory,135 FainMcGaha Oil Corp. v. Murko Oil & Royalty Co.,136 and Felber v. Sklar Oil
Co.,137 to be inapplicable as involving "free of all cost" provisions rather

than tax shifting provisions.' 38
The Fourteenth Court of Appeals also rejected the arguments of Mobil
Producing Texas and New Mexico, Inc. that Santa Fe's action was barred
by federal law and by explicit provisions of the leases. 139 It held that
Mobil was not immune from the action under 26 U.S.C. section
4995(a)(1)(B) because the lease expressly shifted the liability for payment
of the windfall profit tax to Mobil. 140 The court also held that payment of
the windfall profit tax did not constitute payment to Santa Fe under 26
U.S.C. section 4495(a)(4), providing that the producer of any crude oil is
treated as having paid any amount withheld under the subsection, be126. Id. at 846 (citing Carlisle v. Philip Morris, Inc., 805 S.W.2d 498, 505 (Tex. App.Austin 1991, writ denied)).
127. Id. at 846.

128. 756 F.2d 769, 773 (9th Cir. 1985).
129. J.M. Huber Corp., 871 S.W.2d at 846.
130. See Crocker Nat'l Bank v. McFarland Energy, Inc., 140 Cal. App. 3d 6, 189 Cal.
Rptr. 302 (2d Dist. 1983).

131. J.M. Huber Corp., 871 S.W.2d at 846.
132. 812 F.2d 1256, 1259 (9th Cir. 1987).
133. J.M. Huber Corp., 871 S.W.2d at 846.
134. 183 S.W.2d 743 (Tex. Civ. App.-Galveston 1944, writ ref'd).

135. 191 S.W.2d 791 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1945, no writ).
136. 128 Tex. 646, 101 S.W.2d 547 (1937).
137. 235 S.W.2d 481 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1950, writ ref'd).
138. J.M. Huber Corp., 871 S.W.2d at 847.
139. Id. at 847-48.

140. Id at 848. Mobil relied upon Robinson v. A & M Electric, Inc., 713 F.2d 608 (10th
Cir. 1983). Id.
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cause the parties had agreed that it was Mobil, and not Santa Fe, who
4
owed the tax.' '
Finally, and with little explanation, the court held that the leases themselves did not bar Santa Fe's suit by providing that they are subject to all
valid federal law, rules and regulations, because the tax shifting clauses
do not require a violation of the laws; and that the clauses do not defeat
the congressional purpose of the tax by allowing Santa Fe to receive the
windfall that Congress sought to tax since the parties agreed to the
142
clauses.
Kiewit Texas Mining Co. v. Inglish143 was a dispute as to the proper
damages to be awarded for the repudiation and anticipatory breach of a
coal and lignite lease by the lessors, Kiewit Texas Mining Company and
Phillips Coal Company.'" The lease had a primary term of twenty-five
years, but was repudiated in 1989, the twelfth year of the primary term.
As damages, the trial court awarded the plaintiffs the present value of all
annual advance royalties which would have been due had Kiewit honored
the lease for the thirteen years remaining in the primary term, and the
present value of a twelfth and a twenty-fifth year bonus provided for by
the lease. The Waco Court of Appeals reversed the judgment of lower
court, finding that plainitiffs were entitled only to the value of the advance royalties for the years 1989 and 1990, and to the twelfth year bonus
due in 1989.145
The lease was signed in June 1977. However, no coal or lignite was
ever produced or mined on the leased acreage. In addition to a "production royalty," the lease provided for an annual "advance royalty," which
was not related to production, and the bonus payments. The clauses on
bonus payments stated, in part:
In the event that mining operations have not been commenced by
Lessee hereunder prior to the fifth anniversary date hereof (June 28,
1982), Lessee shall pay or tender to Lessor, within thirty days after
said fifth anniversary date, an additional bonus consideration for this
Lease equal to [$100] per acre....
Upon the twenty-fifth (25th) anniversary date of this Lease and if
this Lease is to be extended by other provisions herein, then this
Lease shall then terminate unless, on or prior to such date, Lessee
shall pay Lessor a sum of money equal to [$5001 per acre (representing a $400.00 per acre additional bonus, and the $100.00 per acre
advance royalty for the succeeding year under paragraph 4 of this
Lease).... If such payment is made then this Lease shall continue
in
46
force and effect as provided by other provisions of this Lease.'
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. 865 S.W.2d 240 (Tex. App.-Waco 1993, writ denied).
144. Id. at 242. On appeal, the defendants conceded a breach and repudiation of the
lease and so limited the appeal to questions of damages. Id
145. Kiewit Mining, 865 S.W.2d at 247.
146. Id at 242-43.
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The lease provided for a right of surrender, as follows:
Lessee may at any time from this date execute and deliver to Lessor
or place of record a legally sufficient release covering all of the
Premises and thereupon terminate this Lease as to all of the Premises. Lessee shall thereupon be released from all further obligations
and duties as to the Premises so released, including any obligation to
make advance royalty payments described in paragraph 4, except obligations accrued as of the date of surrender .... 147
However, the right to surrender the lease was restricted as set forth
below:
Attached to this Lease, as Exhibit "D", is a list of Coal Leases, excluding this Lease, all naming Lessee as the mining lessee thereunder, all covering tracts of adjacent lands. Notwithstanding the
provisions of paragraphs 11 and 14 hereof, Lessee may not release
any of the Premises covered hereby or assign this Lease unless and
until it likewise executes, delivers, and records like releases or assignments covering all lands conveyed by the leases tabulated in Exhibit "D". This provision shall have no application to releases
subsequent to the completion of mining and reclamation. 148
Finally, the lease addressed termination by either party:
Termination of this Lease under any paragraph or on account of
any circumstances or event or on account of the fault, option, or action of any person, entity, or party shall be subject to this subparagraph 11(f) and its subparts.
(iii) Termination of this Lease shall in no way diminish or terminate the obligations of Lessee to make any payments to Lessor as
may then be due or accrued or as may become due before such termination becomes effective and such termination shall not entitle
Lessee to demand return of any amounts paid to Lessor prior to such
termination, including, but not limited to, unearned advance
149
payments.
On appeal, Kiewit argued that the lease terminated in 1989 when the
plaintiffs' accepted the repudiation of the lease, 150 and that under the express terms of the lease, no obligation for future payments ever accrued.
In addition, Kiewit contended that there was a failure of conditions precedent to their obligation to make future payments under the lease. The
plaintiffs contended that the trial court properly awarded them the present value of all payments that could have have been due under the terms
of the lease.
The Waco Court of Appeals first held that the lease language was clear
and unambiguous, and did not limit or specify the type of damages that a
147. lt at 243.
148. Id.

149. Id. at 244.
150. The case was tried to the trial court, who concluded that Kiewit repudiated the
lease on June 28, 1989 and that the plaintiffs accepted that repudiation. Neither conclusion
was apparently challenged on appeal. Id. at 244.
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non-breaching party can recover. 51' The court therefore rejected the argument that the lease, by its own terms, prohibited the recovery of payments after its repudiation or termination. 152 The court also rejected the
argument that no royalties or bonuses were due after the repudiation and
termination of the lease in 1989, stating that the breach by Kiewit did not
modify or cancel the lease obligations. 153 The court then found that
plaintiffs' right to damages after the breach depended upon whether the
conditions on which the obligation were based occurred, or if not, were
54
excused.
The court defined a condition precedent as "those acts or events, which
occur subsequently to the making of a contract, that must occur before
there is a right to immediate performance and before there is a breach of
contractual duty.' 55 The appellate court held that payment obligations
under the lease were dependent upon at least two conditions; the obligation to pay advance royalties was conditioned upon the lease being in
force on its anniversary date and the obligation to pay the twenty-fifth
year bonus was conditioned upon extension of the lease beyond the primary term. 156 The court held that after the breach of the lease by Kiewit,
neither of the necessary events occurred. 157
The court noted that the non-occurrence of a condition is excused
when a party's repudiation contributes materially to its non-occurrence,
but is not excused where the condition would not have occurred under
any circumstances. 1 58 Therefore, the court held that the plaintiffs could
not recover annual advance royalties or the twenty-fifth year bonus unless they pleaded and proved that the necessary conditions would have
occurred but for the breach by Kiewit. 159 The court then examined the
record for plaintiffs' evidence of the value of the expected performance.
As to the obligation to pay the twenty-fifth year bonus the court found
that the evidence conclusively established that the lease would not have
been extended beyond the primary term.' 6° Therefore, there would have
been no obligation to make the payment even if no breach occurred, and
so the twenty-fifth year bonus was not lost as a result of the breach.
As to payments of advance royalties, the court held that the plaintiffs
had proved that the failure of the condition precedent to the payment of
advance royalties was excused for the year 1990, because Kiewit had ma151. Kiewit Mining, 865 S.W.2d at 244.
152. 1&
153. Id. at 245 (citing Newman v. San Antonio 1Taction Co., 155 S.W. 688, 690 (Tex.
Civ. App.-San Antonio 1913, no writ)).
154. Id.
155. Id. (quoting Hohenberg Bros. Co. v. George E. Gibbons & Co., 537 S.W.2d 1, 3
(Tex. 1976)).
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF CoNTRACrs § 255 (1981)).
159. Id. (citing City of Fort Worth v. Rosedale Park Apartments, 276 S.W.2d 395, 397
(Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1955, writ ref'd); Howell v. Kelly, 534 S.W.2d 737, 740 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1976, no writ)).
160. Id. at 245-46.
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terially contributed to the non-occurrence by breaching the lease.' 6 1 The
court then held that there was no evidence that the lease would have
been in effect after 1990 even had there been no breach by Kiewit, however, and held that the non-occurrence of the condition precedent to payment of advance royalty was not excused for any year after 1990.162
The court apparently relied on the fact that in 1991 Kiewit released all
of the Exhibit "D" leases, and then released the disputed lease, thereby
complying with the voluntary surrender provision of the lease. 163 The
court noted that the law will not allow Kiewit to rely upon advantageous
lease provisions after breaching that lease, 16' and stated that its holding
should not be interpreted as implicitly giving effect to the surrender provision of the lease.' 65 The court reasoned that it was the surrender of the
Exhibit "D" leases which conclusively established that the lease at issue
would not have remained in effect after 1990, and not the surrender of
the breached lease itself.' 66

It should be noted that the appellate court devoted considerable effort
to the question of the proper measure of damages for breach of the lease,
and held that damages for the anticipatory repudiation of a lease are the
same as damages for any breach of any contract, i.e., those damages necessary to compensate the innocent party for the damages actually sus-

tained.' 67 The amount necessary to compensate the plaintiffs was held,

however, to be the expected value of performance of the lease, as opposed to the face value of the contract. 168 The court rejected the plaintiffs' argument that Pollack v. Pollack'69 entitled them to the face value of

the contract.

70

The Pollack court stated: "[The plaintiff] is entitled in

one suit to receive in damages the present value of all that he would have
received if the contract had been performed.'' a17 The court declined to

adopt what it termed a literal interpretation of the quoted language from
161. Id. at 246.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 246 (citing Baker Marine Corp. v. Weatherby Eng'g Co., 710 S.W.2d 690, 696
(Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1986, no writ).
165. Id. at 247.
166. Id. However, this reasoning is not persuasive. The lease allowed Kiewit to surrender the lease voluntarily, and had it done so, Kiewit could have avoided any subsequent
payment obligations during the remainder of the primary term of the lease. It did not
surrender the lease, however, but instead chose to breach its payment obligation to plaintiffs. To relieve Kiewit of liability for advance royalty payments during the primary term of
the lease, upon proof that it would have surrendered the lease anyway, is to allow Kiewit to
take advantage of the instrument it breached and is a wrong result, without regard to the
specific nature of the proof.
167. Id. at 245 (citing Walter H.E. Jaeger, 11 WILLISTON ON CONTRAC'rs § 1397 (Baker
Voorhis, 3d ed. 1968)).
168. I1&(citing P. G. Lake, Inc. v. Sheffield, 438 S.W.2d 952, 956 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler
1969, writ ref'd n.r.e.); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 344(a) (1981)).
169. 39 S.W.2d 853 (Tex Comm'n App. 1931, holding approved).
170. Kiewit Texas, 865 S.W.2d at 246.
171. Id. at 245 (quoting Pollack, 39 S.W.2d at 855).
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Pollack, concluding that the plaintiff in that case was allowed to collect, in
fact, only the anticipated performance of the contract. 172
B.

SURFACE/MINERAL RELATIONSHIP

In Haupt, Inc. v. Tarrant County Water Controland Improvement Dist.
Number One 73 the subject of dispute was whether the district's flooding
of an eighty-acre tract to create a lake was an inverse condemnation 174 of
the minerals under that tract. In an opinion remanding the case to the
Waco court, 175 the Texas Supreme Court had established the "law of the
case" to be that the "accommodation" or "alternative means" doctrine 76
must be considered "in determining whether inverse condemnation has
occurred when a governmental entity that owns the surface restricts the
mineral owner's surface use."'1 77 The supreme court having also held that
there was legally sufficient evidence to support the invocation of the accommodation doctrine, the issue before the court of appeals was whether
there was factually sufficient evidence. 178 The court held that while there
was sufficient evidence to support a trial court finding that there were
alternative means of accessing the minerals, the evidence was insufficient
to support a finding that those means were reasonable alternatives.
The "accommodation" or "alternative means" doctrine was established
17 9
by the Texas Supreme Court in Getty Oil v. Jones:
[W]here there is an existing use by the surface owner which would
otherwise be precluded or impaired, and where under the established practices in the industry there are alternatives available to the
[mineral owner] whereby the minerals can be recovered, the rules of
reasonable usage of the surface may require the adoption of an alternative by the [mineral owner]. 180
The doctrine recognizes, however, that if there is only one means of surface use by which the minerals may be produced, the mineral estate, being the dominant estate, has the right to produce the minerals regardless
181
of damage to the surface.
The burden of proof was on the surface owner "to show that the particular manner of surface use being... [proposed by the mineral owner] is
172. Kiewit Texas, 865 S.W.2d at 245-46.
173. 870 S.W.2d 350 (Tex. App.-Waco 1994, no writ).
174. "Inverse condemnation occurs whenever property is 'taken' or 'damaged' for public use without adequate compensation." Id. at 351.
175. Tarrant County Water Control and Improvement Dist. Number One v. Haupt,
Inc., 854 S.W.2d 909 (Tex. 1993).
176. Haupt, Inc., 870 S.W.2d at 353.
177. Id. at 352. Until the Texas Supreme Court's opinion, the accommodation doctrine
had never been extended to a governmental surface owner in an inverse condemnation
proceeding. Id at 353. And the court notes that the subject was not raised by either party

until the case was in the supreme court. It
178. Id The Texas Supreme Court also held that the Water District could "only use the
surface estate as a reservoir by flooding the surface." Haupt,Inc. 854 S.W.2d at 912.
179. 470 S.W.2d 618 (Tex. 1971).
180. Haupt, Inc., 870 S.W.2d at 353 (citing Getty Oil, 470 S.W.2d at 622).
181. Id.
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not reasonably necessary to the mineral owner under all circumstances... ." which may be done "by proving that the mineral owner has
available other reasonable means of production... that will not interfere
with the surface owner's existing use."' 182
After examining the water district's proof, the court held that the evidence was factually sufficient to support the trial court's finding that the
mineral owners had alternative means of accessing the minerals, 183 such
as directional drilling and platform drilling. But the court failed to find
sufficient evidence that those alternatives were "reasonable":
Assessing the reasonableness of a particular means of production,
especially in the context of an inverse condemnation proceeding,
must include its impact on the value of the mineral estate .... If, as

here, a mineral owner has available several means of accessing the
minerals, one of which will maximize the value of the mineral estate
and other alternatives that, if used, will either totally destroy or reduce its value by three-fourths, one cannot logically or rationally argue that the alternative methods provide reasonable access to the
minerals.184
Finding that the record "clearly shows" that the only method of drilling
which would preserve the value of the mineral estate was by drilling a
vertical well on dry land, the court remanded the case for new trial. 85
C.

ROYALTY INTERESTS

Atkinson Gas Co. v. Albrecht

86

was an appeal by a lessee-operator

(Atkinson) from a trial court judgment for the mineral-royalty owners
(Albrecht) declaring that Atkinson's lease had terminated due to cessation of production and awarding damages in the amount of a bonus lost
by Albrecht when Atkinson refused to release his lease. 187 The case had
been tried to the court and judgment entered for Albrecht, apparently
without findings of fact or conclusions of law. The court of appeals
affirmed.
The lease was executed in 1985, provided for a one-year primary term,
and contained a sixty-day cessation of production clause. Atkinson
drilled a gas well which was produced in accordance with the lease terms
until December 9, 1991 when Albrecht and Atkinson's well gauger shut
in the well because of Atkinson's failure to make timely payments, respectively, of royalty and wages. Albrecht notified Atkinson that " '[tihe
182. Id An additional burden of the surface owner, which was met as a matter of law
(See Getty Oil, supra note 180, at 623) was to show that "any alternative uses of the surface, other than the existing use, are impracticable and unreasonable under all the circumstances." Id.
183. Haupt, Inc., 870 S.W. 2d at 355.
184. Id at 354.
185. Id. at 355.

186. 878 S.W.2d 236 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1994, writ denied).
187. The only question on appeal involving the damage award was one of evidence and
will not be discussed.
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well was shut in today. No pay-No Gas!' 188 Atkinson, however, disregarded the note, because the pipeline purchaser, through error, continued
to report the gas as flowing at a reduced rate and continued to pay rents,
including royalties, to Atkinson. 189
On January 22, 1992 the Railroad Commission sealed the well due to
Atkinson's failure to file production reports, making production physically impossible. On March 18, 1992 Albrecht requested that Atkinson
release the lease under the sixty-day cessation of production clause. Two
days later, on March 20, 1992 the Commission order was lifted and the
well commenced flowing. In April 1992 Atkinson paid and Albrecht accepted royalty payments for 1991 and 1992, which erroneously included
payments for those days when the well was shut in.
Atkinson argued that by shutting in the well, Albrecht repudiated the
lease, thereby relieving him of any obligation to conduct operations on
the land in order to maintain the lease. 190 The court, however, held that
there had not been a "clear, unequivocal challenge to the lessee's title to,
and interest in the lease . .." and that Albrecht's actions did not amount
to a "lockout" which prevented Atkinson physically from entering the
lease to resume production.' 9 1 Finding that Atkinson was "generally free
to turn the well back on," the court held that Albrecht's actions "failed to
rise to the level of preventing Atkinson from producing or repudiating
the lease."' 192
Atkinson also argued that Albrecht's actions in shutting in the well and
in accepting erroneous royalty payments for the shut-in period estopped
him from asserting that the lease had terminated. Recognizing that the
doctrine of "quasi-estoppel" operates to prevent one from accepting the
benefits of a transaction only to thereafter take an inconsistent position
to avoid corresponding obligations, the court nevertheless held that
"[a]lthough it may have been improper for Albrecht to inconvenience
Atkinson . . ." by shutting in the well, "it was not inconsistent with Albrecht's subsequent claim that cessation of production for the requisite
period terminated the lease.' 93 The court concluded that Albrecht's
188. Atkinson Gas, 878 S.W.2d at 238.
189. It is common for a gas purchaser to make all payments to an operator such as
Atkinson, who is then obligated to make royalty payments to the mineral owners.
190. Atkinson relied upon Kothmann v. Boley, 158 Tex. 56, 308 S.W.2d 1, 4 (1957), and
other cases.
191. Atkinson Gas, 878 S.W.2d at 239. But see Morriss v. First Nat. Bank of Mission,
249 S.W.2d 269, 279 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1952, writ ref'd n.r.e.), (holding that the
non-payment of royalty does not terminate a lease, in the absence of a specific clause to
that effect). While Albrecht's actions in shutting in the gas for non-payment of royalties
were arguably a breach of the lease, or at least were an interference with the lessee's oper-

ations, the court in Atkinson does not characterize those actions other than to state that
there was neither a repudiation nor a lockout. Atkinson Gas, 878 S.W.2d at 239.
192. Id.
193. Id. at 240. There is nothing in the court's opinion as to whether any credit could or
should have been given for the length of shut-in time attributable to Albrecht's actions.
Without question, some period of the shut-in time prior to the Commission's sealing of the
well was necessarily used in arriving at lack of production for more than sixty days.
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conduct did not amount to a "ratification, election, acquiescence, or actype of
ceptance of benefits, as have traditionally been considered the '194
conduct which may form the basis of a claim of quasi estoppel.'
The court further held that Albrecht's acceptance of the erroneously
paid royalty payments for the shut-in period would not estop him from
asserting that the lease had terminated. 195 The court reasoned that "the
position or conduct which is the basis for the estoppel ...[must] have
196

been taken before the assertion of the position sought to be estopped."'
Albrecht having asserted that the lease had terminated, which was the
of the royalty payconduct sought to be estopped, prior to the acceptance
97
ments, precluded Atkinson's assertion of estoppel.1

Atkinson also argued that Albrecht's acceptance of the erroneously
paid royalties was actually an acceptance of shut-in royalties which extended the life of the lease. Finding no proof in the record of intent to
pay shut-in royalties, or that they were the proper amount, and observing
that in any event, they were paid after expiration of the lease, the court
held that no shut-in royalties were paid. 198
Finally the court held that the force majeure clause of the lease was not
triggered by the Commission's sealing of the well, because the Commission's actions were the result of Atkinson's failure to comply with Commission regulations, and were not the result of "circumstances beyond the
reasonable control of the lessee ....199
III. JOINT OPERATIONS
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, in Norman v. Apache Corp.,200 was
called upon to construe, as a matter of law, several provisions of a joint
operating agreement covering oil and gas working interests located in
Brazoria County, Texas.
In 1977, Dow Chemical Company drilled and completed the Sue and
Dwight Brothers No. 1 Well on oil and gas leases which were subsequently pooled with other acreage and unitized into production units.
The Sue and Dwight Brothers Well was the only well on the Brothers Gas
Unit, and the leases within the unit were maintained only by production
from that well. In 1976, prior to the completion of the well, the owners of
the working interests in the leases had executed a joint operating agreement, giving Dow the exclusive control of the oil and gas operations on
the subject leases. In 1982, Apache Corporation took over operations of
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Atkinson Gas, 878 S.W.2d at 240.

197. Id. The court does not mention ratification as a contractual theory, but it should
be noted that a key element of that theory, to-wit, knowledge by Albrecht, both of the fact
of termination and of the receipt of royalties for the shut-in period, was established.
198. Id at 241.
199. Id.
200. 19 F.3d 1017 (5th Cir. 1994).
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the Brothers Gas Unit, subject to the terms of the original 1976 operating
agreement.
Apache continued to operate the Brothers Well until July of 1990. At
that time, Apache ceased production from the well and Apache employees prepared paperwork showing the well to be "uneconomical to produce" 20 1 and "not expected to return to production. ' 20 2 In September
1990, Apache filed with the Texas Railroad Commission a notice of intention to plug and abandon the Brothers Well, and in late December of that
year, recommended to the working interest owners that the well be
plugged and abandoned. The owners requested that Apache continue to
operate the Brothers Well, but then learned that operations had ceased as
of July 1990 and that the leases formerly held by production from the well
had been lost. The working interest owners filed suit in 1991, alleging
that Apache breached contractual and fiduciary duties under the joint
operating agreement by failing to give them advance notice of its decision
to plug and abandon the well; by failing to take reasonable actions to
prevent the lapse of the Brothers Unit leases; by failing to notify them of
cessation of production from the well; and by misrepresenting to them,
through the sending of monthly billing statements, that it continued to
operate the well after July 1990. The trial court granted a summary20 3judgment in favor of Apache on all claims, and the owners appealed.
The appellate court first held that the lower court correctly found that
the working interest owner's complaint did not allege sufficient facts to
support a claim of fraud against Apache. 20 4 The Fifth Circuit then considered whether Apache was entitled to summary judgment on its claims
of breach of fiduciary duty. Apache argued that neither the joint operating agreement nor the circumstances surrounding its relationship with the
owners could give rise to a fiduciary duty; and that in fact, a letter agreement between the parties expressly negated the existence of a fiduciary
relationship.
Applying Texas law, 20 5 the court found that the letter agreement relied
upon by Apache addressed the relationship between Apache and the
owners only as it concerned potential liabilities or obligations to third
parties. 2°6 The letter agreement did not, therefore, proscribe the creation
201. Id at 1019.
202. Id.
203. Id. at 1021. The trial court granted its summary judgment on the original complaint
filed by the working interest owners, after having found that an amended complaint filed
by the owner, alleging additional causes of action, was not timely filed. The Fifth Circuit
also refused to consider the amended complaint. Id. at 1022.
204. Norman, 19 F.3d at 1022 (citing FED. R. Civ. P. 9(b), and relying upon Haber Oil
Co. v. Swinehart Co. (In re Haber Oil Co.), 12 F.3d 426, 439 (5th Cir. 1994) and Shushany
v. Allwaste, Inc., 992 F.2d 517, 521 (5th Cir. 1993)).
205. The case was in federal court on diversity jurisdiction. Id. at 1023-24.
206. Norman, 19 F.3d at 1024. The pertinent language in the letter agreement stated:
The obligations and liabilities of the parties hereto shall be several and not
joint or collective, and each party shall be responsible only for his or its obligations in accordance with the terms and conditions of this agreement. This
agreement does not constitute or create a joint venture or partnership, min-
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of fiduciary duties. 207 The court then cited a number of Texas cases 20 8 for
the proposition that unless specifically set out in the operating agreement,
a fiduciary relationship does not arise between the operator and working
interest owners by virtue of the contractual joint operations; however,
such a relationship may arise from a special relationship between the parties, such as a partnership, agency, or confidential relationship. 2 °9 Because the owners did not assert a partnership or agency relationship with
Apache, the court examined the summary judgment evidence for a fact
issue with respect to whether a confidential relationship may have existed
between the parties. Without defining the elements or nature of a confidential relationship, the court noted that not every relationship involving
great trust and confidence is fiduciary in nature, that evidence that a relationship is cordial and of long duration does not evidence a confidential
relationship and that mere subjective trust alone is not enough create a
confidential relationship.2 10 The court then held that the owners had
duties
failed to raise a fact issue with respect to the existence of fiduciary
2 11
and so affirmed the holding of the lower court on that issue.
The court next considered the owners' breach of contract claims
against Apache. The Fifth Circuit held that the section of the joint operating agreement which addressed delay rentals and shut-in gas well payments applied only to the temporary, and not to permanent, cessation of
production from a well. 212 Noting that the provision of the joint operateral or otherwise, or association, or agency or a fiduciary relationship of any
kind or character whereby any party hereto shall become liable for the acts
and deeds of any other party hereto....
Id
207. Id. at 1024.
208. See Crowder v. Tri-C Resources, Inc., 821 S.W.2d 393, 399 (Tex. App.-Houston
[1st Dist.] 1991, no writ); Taylor v. GWR Operating Co., 820 S.W.2d 908, 911-12
(Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1991, writ denied); Hamilton v. Texas Oil & Gas Corp.,
648 S.W.2d 316, 320 (Tex. App.-EI Paso 1982, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Crim Truck & Tractor v.
Navistar Int'l Trans. Corp., 823 S.W.2d 591, 594 (Tex. 1992); MacDonald v. Follett, 142
Tex. 616, 180 S.W.2d 334, 337-38 (1944).
209. Norman, 19 F.3d at 1024-25.
210. Id. at 1025 (citing Crim Truck & Tractor v. Navistar Int'l Trans. Corp., 823 S.W.2d
591, 595 (citing Thigpen v. Locke, 363 S.W.2d 247, 253 (Tex. 1962)).
211. Id. at 1026.
212. Id. at 1027. With respect to delay rentals and shut-in payments, the joint operating
agreement provides:
Operator shall pay all delay rentals and shut-in well payments which may
be required under the terms of all leases covered by this agreement and submit evidence of each payment to the other parties. Each party shall notify
the other, in writing, at least thirty (30) days prior to the date any rental
payment is due, as to whether or not it elects to participate in the payment
thereof. In the event either party elects not to participate in a rental payment, and the other party elects to participate therein, then the party desiring
not to participate shall promptly execute and deliver to the party desiring to
participate in such rental payment an assignment of such non-participating
party's right, title and interest in and to such lease, or leases, and such lease,
or leases, shall no longer be subject to this agreement. The amount of such
payments, when made for the account of both parties, shall be charged by
Operator to the joint account of the parties. Operator shall not be liable to
the other party in damages for the loss of any lease or interests therein if,
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ing agreement which governs abandonment of wells imposes no contrac-

tual duty by the operator to notify working interest owners of an intent to

abandon or permanently cease production from a well,213 and citing
Fuller v. Phillips Petroleum Co.,214 the court affirmed the lower court's
judgment with respect to the owner's claims of breach of contract for
failure to notify the owners of the abandonment of the Brothers Well. 215
Finally, the court considered the owners' claims that Apache failed to
act as a reasonably prudent operator. Noting that Texas courts have determined that "in the context of a joint operating agreement, the requirement that Apache conduct all operations-as permitted by, required by,
and within the limits of the agreement-in 'a good and workmanlike
manner' means that Apache has a duty to perform such operations 'as a
reasonably prudent person engaged in drilling oil wells,' i.e., as a reasonably prudent operator. ' 216 Relying upon Johnston v. American Cometra,
Inc.,217 the Fifth Circuit rejected Apache's claim that its obligation to perform in a good and workmanlike manner extends only to the operations
expressly required by the joint operating agreement and does not create
any independent duties. 218 After reviewing the summary judgment evidence, the court concluded that Apache had not proved, as a matter of
law, that it acted as a prudent operator under the specific circumstances
through mistake or oversight, any rental or shut-in well payment is not paid.
There shall be no adjustment of interests of the parties in the remaining portion of the Unit Area in the event of a failure to pay, or erroneous payment
of rental or shut-in well payments. If any party secures a new lease covering
the terminated interest, such acquisition shall be subject to provisions of Section 23 of this agreement.
Operator shall promptly notify each party hereto of the date on which any
gas well located on the Unit Area is shut in and the reason therefor and the
date on which said well is restored to production.
Id
213. Id. at 1027. With respect to abandonment of wells, the joint operating agreement
provides, in pertinent part:
No well, other than any well which has been drilled or reworked pursuant to
Section 12 hereof for which the Consenting parties have not been fully reimbursed as therein provided, which has been completed as a producer shall be
plugged and abandoned without the consent of all parties; provided, however, if all parties do not agree to the abandonment of any well, those wishing to continue its operation shall tender to each of the other parties its
proportionate share of the value of the well's salvable material and equipment ... less the estimated cost to salvaging and the estimated cost of plugging and abandoning. Each abandoning party shall then assign to the nonabandoning parties, without warranty, express or implied, as to title or as to
quantity, quality, or fitness for use of the equipment and material, all of its
interest in the well and its equipment, together with its interest in the leasehold estate as to, but only as to, the interval intervals of the formation or
formations then open to production. ...
Id.
214. 872 F.2d 655, 658-59 (5th Cir. 1984).
215. Norman, 19 F.3d at 1029.
216. Id. at 1029 (quoting Johnston v. America Cometra, Inc., 837 S.W.2d 711, 716 (Tex.
App.-Austin 1992, writ denied)).
217. 837 S.W.2d 711, 716 (Tex. App.-Austin 1992, writ denied).
218. Norman, 19 F.3d at 1030.
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of the case, and therefore reversed the judgment of the lower court on
2 19
this issue and remanded for further proceedings.
IV. GAS TRANSPORTATION CONTRACTS
In Tennessee Gas Pipeline Co. v. Federal Energy Regulatory
Comm'n,220 the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed an order of the
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) which prohibited Tennessee Gas Pipeline Co. from making certain rate changes under a 1991
gas transportation contract with Flagg Energy Development
22 1
Corporation.
In 1988 and 1989, Tennessee entered into agreements with seven different companies, including Flagg, for the transportation of natural gas to
points in the Northeast. In connection with those agreements, Tennessee
sought FERC approval to construct and operate new pipeline facilities,
and to transport gas to Flagg through new pipeline segments designated
by Tennessee as segments U, 2 and 3, and to charge Flagg at rates set
forth on a Rate Schedule known as NET-EU. FERC approved the construction of segments 2 and 3, among others, in May of 1990. In that May
1990 order, FERC denied Tennessee's request to charge Flagg for any use
of segments which had not yet been approved, but stated that Tennessee
could seek to amend its NET-EU rates to include the costs associated
with new segments after they were approved and placed in service.
In 1991, Flagg and Tennessee entered into a "Firm Natural Gas Transportation Agreement," which referred to, and was specifically based
upon, the May 1990 order. The contract set out a specific rate formula
for transporting the gas and also provided that Tennessee had the unilateral right "to file and make effective changes in the rates, charges, and
conditions applicable to service. '222 Subsequently, Tennessee filed a limited rate case under section 4 of the Natural Gas Act 22 3 (NGA) to revise
the rates in its NET-EU rate schedule and, among other requests, sought
to charge Flagg and another company for use of the segment U pipeline.
Flagg intervened in the rate case, contending in part that its 1991 contract with Tennessee allowed Tennessee to charge it for the use of segments 2 and 3, but not for the use of segment U. In an expedited paper
hearing, the FERC found the contract to be clear and unambiguous and
determined that it did not allow Tennessee to charge Flagg for the use of
the segment U pipeline.
219. Id. at 1031. Note, however, that Judge Eugene Davis dissented in part, arguing
that a letter from Apache to plaintiffs established that Apache was entitled to judgment as
a matter of law, that it did not breach its obligation to perform in a good and workmanlike
manner by failing to notify the owners of its intent to terminate production of the Brothers
Well. Id. at 1031-32. The letter, however, does not notify the plaintiffs of an intent to plug
and abandon the well. Instead, it states Apache's reasons for refusing to plug and abandon
as of that date.
220. 17 F.3d. 98 (5th Cir. 1994).
221. Id. at 99.
222. Tennessee Gas, 17 F.3d at 100.
223. 15 U.S.C. § 717 (1988).
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The Fifth Circuit first determined that the case must be decided on the
basis of the specific wording of the contract. 224 The court relied upon the
decision of the United States Supreme Court in United Gas Pipe Line Co.
v. Mobile Gas Serv. Corp.,225 for the rule that the NGA does not allow
natural gas companies to unilaterally change rates established by valid
contract, and that court's decision in United Gas Pipe Line Co. v. Memphis Light, Gas and Water Division,226 for the rule that natural gas companies may seek unilateral changes in their rates unless a contract
expressly precludes them from so doing. 227 In other words, a natural gas
company may always seek to alter its rates, unless there is a contractual
obligation not to do so. Consequently, the court looked solely to the contract language used by Flagg and Tennessee to determine Tennessee's
right to seek a change in the rates charged under the contract.
The court rejected Flagg's argument that it should defer to FERC's
construction of the 1991 contract. 22 Declaring it well-settled law within
the Fifth Circuit that the court will "review the construction of natural gas
contracts freely, ' 229 it cited Mid-Louisiana Gas Co. v. Federal Energy
Regulatory Comm'n and El Paso Natural Gas Co. v. FederalEnergy Regulatory Comm'n for the rule that it will defer to FERC's construction of
natural gas contracts only where FERC has applied its factual or technical expertise in reaching a conclusion. Finding that FERC did not rely on
such expertise, the court reviewed the construction of the contract de
230
novo.
Again relying on Mid-Louisiana Gas,231 the federal court stated that it
should apply the normal rules of contract construction in interpreting a
natural gas contract. 232 It held that Texas law233 requires that a court
review an entire contract to determine its meaning, and that meaning,
effect and purpose are to be given to each word in the contract if possible. 234 The appellate court then reviewed the two contract provisions primarily at issue.
The contract read, in part, as follows:
8.2. Transportation Rates-Beginning on the Commencement
Date, the compensation to be paid by Shipper to Transporter for the
transportation service provided for herein shall be payable monthly
224. Tennessee Gas, 17 F.3d at 102.
225. 350 U.S. 332 (1956).
226. 358 U.S. 103 (1958).
227. Tennessee Gas, 17 F.3d at 102.
228. Id. at 102.
229. See El Paso Natural Gas Co. v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 881 F.2d 161,
164 (5th Cir. 1989); Pennzoil Co. v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 789 F.2d 1128, 113536 (5th Cir. 1986).
230. Tennessee Gas, 17 F.3d at 102.
231. 780 F.2d at 1242-43.
232. Tennessee Gas, 17 F.3d at 102.
233. See Eagle Life Ins. Co. v. G.I.C. Ins. Co., 697 S.W.2d 648, 650 (Tex. App.-San
Antonio 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
234. Tennessee Gas, 17 F.3d at 103 (citing TM Prod., Inc. v. Nichols, 542 S.W.2d 704,
708 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.)).
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in accordance with Article X hereof and shall be equal to the sum of
the following: (a) the product of (1) the sum of the "D-1" charges
for Segments 2 and 3 under Transporter's NET-EU Rate Schedule
and (2) the Transportation Quantity, (b) the product of (1) the sum
of the "D-2" charges for Segments 2 and 3 under Transporter's NETEU Rate Schedule and (2) the "D-2 Billing Determinant" for the
applicable billing period as set forth in Exhibit B hereto, (c) the
product of (1) the sum of the "Commodity" charges for Segments 2
and 3 under Transporter's NET-EU Rate Schedule and any applicable surcharges as included in Transporter's effective FERC Gas
Tariff and (2) the quantity of gas delivered by Transporter to Shipper
during the applicable billing period.
References herein to Transporter's NET-EU Rate Schedule shall
include any successor or substitute rate schedules....
8.4 Rate Changes-Shipperagrees that Transporter shall have the
unilateral right pursuantto this Article VIII to file and make effective
changes in the rates, charges, and conditions applicable to service
pursuant to the Rate Schedule under which this service is rendered
and/or any provisions of the General Terms and Conditions of Transporter's FERC Gas Tariff Volume No. 1 as such Tariff may be revised or replaced from time to time. Without prejudice to Shipper's
right to contest such charges, Shipper agrees to pay the effective rate
for service rendered pursuant
to this Agreement, subject to FERC
235
review and adjustment.
FERC had construed the two sections to mean that Tennessee's right to
file revised rates under section 8.4 was limited, by use of the phrase "pursuant to this Article VIII," to the segments of pipeline referred to in section 8.2. FERC argued that "pursuant to" is a restrictive phrase meaning
"in conformance or agreement with" or "according to."'236 FERC reasoned that section 8.2 allowed charges only in connection with segments 2
and 3, and not in connection with segment U. If section 8.4 must be read
in conformance or agreement with section 8.2, section 8.4 did not allow
Tennessee to revise its rates to include charges not provided for in section
8.2, therefore excluding any charges for segment U.
The Fifth Circuit was unpersuaded by both FERC's interpretation of
"pursuant to" and its construction of the contract. 237 The court noted
that the contract sets forth a formula for charging for the use of segments
2 and 3 based on four variables. 2 38 The dollar amount of each variable is
not determinable by reference to the contract, but requires reference to
the NET-EU Rate Schedule, which the contract defined to include any
successor or substitute rate schedules. 239 Finding that all references to
the NET-EU Rate Schedules in section 8.2 necessarily included revised
235.
236.
237.
238.
239.
relied.

Id.
FERC cited BLACK'S LAW DICIONARY 1236 (6th ed. 1990).
Tennessee Gas, 17 F.3d at 104.
Id.
Id. The opinion does not set out the specific contract language on which the court
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or changed rate schedules, the court held that FERC's interpretation
would turn the language of section 8.4 into "mere surplusage." 240 As to
the meaning of the phrase "pursuant to," the court held that the definition relied upon by FERC effectively eviscerated section 8.4 from the
contract. 241 The court also noted that the definition of "pursuant to" relied upon by FERC was limited to its use in a statute. 242 The court found
the proper meaning of "pursuant to" was "in carrying out" or "in the
course of carrying out." 243 Finally, the court found its construction of
section 8.4 to be consistent with other contract provisions. 244
Flagg also contended that the contract should be read to allow Tennessee to revise "charges" for segments 2 and 3, but not overall gas transportation rates, such as adding charges for segment U, and that the word
"rates" was employed by the parties in a technical sense. In rejecting
these arguments, the Fifth Circuit found that such a reading would, again,
completely negate section 8.4, and render the word "rates" superfluous. 245 The court also held that there was no evidence that the word
"rates" was used in any technical sense and concluded that its construction of the contract did not make section 8.2 meaningless, but instead
rendered its provisions temporary; i.e., effective only until Tennessee
chose to6 revise the transportation rates in a manner consistent with the
24

NGA.

240. Id.
241. Id.
242. Id.
243. Tennessee Gas, 17 F.3d at 104-05 (citing WEBSTER'S NEW COLLEGIATE DicrnoNARY 930 (1979) and BLACK'S LAW DICIONARY 1237 (6th ed. 1990)).

244. Id. at 105. In particular, the court found that the "pursuant to" language in section

8.4 was intended to remove Article VIII from the terms of section 16.1 of the contract
which prohibited modification of any term absent written consent by both parties. Id. at
105.
245. Id. at 105.
246. Id at 106. The court did not address whether the revisions attempted by Tennessee were in fact consistent with the NGA. Id.

